Whose Future? Parallel Governance and the Redefinition of the State in the ‘Future of Egypt Authority’ Law
Policy Paper
Prepared by Nada Arafat, researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), and reviewed by Mohamed Ramadan and Wael Gamal from EIPR’s Economic and Social Justice Unit.
On July 26, 2026, the Official Gazette published the text of Law No. 147 of 2026 on the reorganization of the Future of Egypt Authority for Sustainable Development (FoE), as ratified by the President. The law took effect the following day.
The ratification and issuance of the law followed a fast-tracked parliamentary process. The Speaker of the House of Representatives referred the government's draft to a joint committee on July 6. The committee approved it in just two sessions, and the House approved it in two general sessions within less than a week.
Thanks to the new law, FoE now reports directly to the President of the Republic and enjoys administrative and technical independence from the government structure and the rules governing its operations and market interventions. The law also granted the authority multiple roles that were historically distributed among various entities, transferring to it responsibilities and assets that previously belonged to ministries and other state agencies.
The law also established two financial arms under the authority’s management: a sovereign investment fund and a service fund for social projects. Furthermore, the authority and its two funds are granted budgets independent of the state’s general budget, to be prepared, approved, executed, and monitored according to internal rules, without adhering to government laws and regulations, and with surpluses carried over from one year to the next—in violation of the principle of the unity of the general budget.
The unique status and independence granted to authority are most apparent in the "Sustainable Development Zones," in which FoE’s head takes over from the minister, governor, and head of the relevant agency that had jurisdiction over the zone before its transfer. By combining the powers of planning, licensing, investment, inspection, and the imposition of sanctions, the authority monopolizes the roles of regulator, operator, and supervisor.
Shortly before the final parliamentary vote, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) published a paper titled "Inadequate Oversight and Unlimited Exceptions," analyzing the bill as presented by the government and approved by the joint parliamentary committee. Although the final text included minor parliamentary amendments to address certain procedural objections, these interventions did not touch upon the structural philosophy of the law. The law’s structure was left unchanged and even opened the door for expanding the authority's powers in other areas.
This paper seeks to complete the analysis of the management model established by the law, aiming to clarify whether the legalization of the authority's status represents calculated institutional modernization intended to diversify the state’s economic and social tools, or merely a solidification of a recurring pattern in Egyptian economic policy, based on creating parallel decision-making centers and hollowing out the administrative apparatus and ministries of their responsibilities, which expands the powers of the executive authority at the expense of public accountability mechanisms. The paper tracks the repercussions of this model on the structure of ministries, government oversight, public funds, social spending, water resources, and the future of food security. It will also highlight the legal and financial problems introduced in the final text of the law.
