The Executive Regulations (hereinafter bylaws) of the 2024 Asylum Law were published in the Official Gazette dated 21 May 2026, stipulating a three-month period before they enter into force. The Prime Minister’s Decree (no. 1568 of 2026) publishing the bylaws constitutes a major and long-anticipated step towards the operationalisation of the Asylum Law, especially the establishment of a national system to manage all asylum matters previously managed by UNHCR over decades. 

The Asylum Law (no. 164 of 2024) granted the Prime Minister six months from its promulgation in December 2024 to issue the law’s executive regulations (ending June 2025). The law further set a three month period (ending March 2025) to create and appoint members of a new Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs as the competent authority for the design and implementation of the new asylum system. However, more than a year overdue, the bylaws were adopted while the decree creating the Standing Committee and naming its members has not been issued (only the chairperson of the committee was appointed by decree in February 2026). It is therefore unclear (and unlikely) that the new system will be completed, resourced and functional by August 2026 when the bylaws enter into force. The absence of any mention of any interim role for UNHCR with regard to protection or refugee status determination until the national system is fully operational raises serious concern over the fate of newly arriving asylum seekers and their protection from detention or deportation. 

Positively, the bylaws introduced some clarity on the operating procedures of the Standing Committee and its technical secretariat during the refugee status determination process, including the rights of asylum seekers to an individualised hearing, legal representation, interpretation in a language they understand, as well as protections for vulnerable groups and unaccompanied minors. 

However, there remains glaring omissions and protection gaps carried over from the provisions of the law, and nearly all legal concerns over the most dangerous provisions in the law that contravene international obligations have not been remedied, contrary to repeated assurances by government officials in public statements and private engagements. 

This memo outlines and briefly explains some of the most salient concerns over the bylaws, and presents recommendations for addressing them. However, it is important to note that –even with amendments and improvements– the Asylum Law continues to include deeply flawed provisions that contravene human rights and refugee law which the bylaws cannot contradict or supersede, highlighting the need for the law to be amended by parliament to repeal those provisions. 

 

1. Guarantees for the absolute prohibition against non-refoulment 

 

1. While the Asylum Law stipulates that “refugees may not be returned to their country of origin or of habitual residence” (Article 13), it limits this absolute prohibition to refugees and does not extend it to asylum seekers. The bylaws, on the other hand, are void of any provisions that recognise the right of asylum seekers to be protected against refoulement until final examination of their claim and through all phases of petition for review and judicial appeal. This is of particular grave concern in light of the current crackdown which saw authorities deport thousands of both refugees and asylum seekers –irrespective of their legally protected status– for alleged violations of residency requirements, which has reached unprecedented levels since the beginning of 2026. 

2. ٌThe risk of detention and deportation, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement, is further aggravated by the bylaws’ requirement for asylum seekers to also obtain residency permits from the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and stipulation that national asylum seeker cards expire in six months.  Authorities are already engaged in wide scale refoulement of refugees and asylum seekers –despite their protected status– with the MOI taking between 18 months and two years to process or renew residency applications. 

3. The need to strengthen protection against nonrefoulement under Article 13 of the asylum law has been highlighted by UNHCR in its commentary published in July 2025. The commentary clearly stated that the “principle of nonrefoulement also applies to asylum seekers and protects them from removal to their countries of nationality or habitual residence, or any other country where they are at risk, prior to a final determination on their refugee status being handed down”, and that “protection from refoulement must be ensured while asylum processing is being carried out at first instance and appeal”. UNHCR’s analysis further recommended that the nonrefoulement protection be clearly provided in the law and “its procedural safeguards in the Executive Regulations”.

4. In order to comply with international law, the bylaws must 

1. include explicit and comprehensive provisions protecting both asylum seekers and refugees from refoulement to territories where they would be at risk of persecution or serious harm. The provisions must confirm the suspensive effect of judicial review and prohibition against deportation throughout the consideration of a rejected applicant’s request for review and judicial appeal. 

2. include a clear stipulation that registration documents issued by the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs shall be recognised as signifying legal status in and of themselves, so that delays in processing or renewing residency applications are not used as grounds for deportation. 

 

2. Protected status of already recognised refugees 

 

1. The bylaws require already recognised refugees to submit their UNHCR documents issued prior to entry into force of the bylaws to the Standing Committee “to take the necessary measures in accordance with the provisions of the asylum law and its bylaws”. However, the bylaws lack any provisions that uphold the continuity of the protected status of UNHCR-recognised refugees under the new national asylum framework. This absence risks forcing already recognised refugees to undergo a complete reexamination of their asylum claim and repeat the entire refugee status determination process, risking the loss of the protection and rights to which they are entitled. 

2. This lack of clarity is of particular concern for those already recognised by UNHCR as refugees on grounds criminalized in Egyptian legislation, especially in the areas of religion or belief, sexuality, human rights defense, and non-violent political activism. Reopening the asylum files of these special protection cases creates a risk of denial or revocation of already determined refugee status, especially in light of the bylaws’ imposition of an expiry date of three years for refugee cards and requirement for all recognised refugees to apply to the Standing Committee for renewal. 

3. The bylaws should include a provision recognizing the refugee status of those already determined by UNHCR to be refugees, and exempting them from a reexamination of their asylum claim under the new national system, as this would amount to retroactive application of a new legal framework to cases already adjudicated and concluded.

 

3. Data transfer, new arrivals, and ‘transition void’ 

 

1. The absence of any detail to date on the transition roadmap and duration for the shifting of the registration and status determination process from UNHCR to the new asylum system raises serious concerns about  the legal limbo created by this transition void for new arrivals. Article 3 of the bylaws only state that the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs will “take the necessary measures to regulate cooperation with UNHCR…in order to put in place the mechanisms and procedures needed [for the Committee] to exercise its mandate with regard to refugees and asylum seekers…”. This language provides no guarantee that newly arrived asylum seekers will be able to exercise their right of asylum or access international protection following the entry into force of the bylaws in the event that the Standing Committee is not operational by the end of August 2026. 

2. The bylaws leave unclear what would happen in the event  that the Standing Committee and its technical secretariat and internal systems are not operational by September 2026. In addition to new arrivals, UNHCR registered refugees and asylum seekers also face the risk of falling into this transitional void. The bylaws confirm that UNHCR cards issued prior to the entry into force date will remain valid until their expiry or until the Standing Committee starts issuing documentation, whichever is nearest. But the bylaws contain no provisions that ensure the protection and/or documentation for already registered refugees and asylum seekers should their UNHCR issued documents expire after entry into force of the bylaws and prior to the Standing Committee being able to issue documentation. 

3. The bylaws require UNHCR to transfer the data of all already-recognised refugees as well as all those “who have approached [UNHCR]” prior to the entry into force of the bylaws. For both categories, transfer of data must be conditional on specific, individual, and informed consent. There are significant  concerns for the freedom, security, and safety of special protection cases and those who claimed asylum on grounds criminalised under Egyptian law. Data transferred to Egyptian authorities must be limited to the narrowest possible scope needed for creating and maintaining a national record of refugees and asylum seekers. 

4. The bylaws must explicitly indicate that UNHCR would continue to receive and register newly arriving asylum seekers and to renew documentation of already registered asylum seekers and refugees, until the Standing Committee is fully operational. The bylaws must be amended to stipulate that UNHCR issued cards are considered valid until the national system is fully operational and the Standing Committee begins issuing its own documentation. 

 

4. Revocation, rejection, and cessation of asylum

 

1. The bylaws fail to address numerous flawed provisions in the asylum law with regard to exclusion, rejection, revocation, and cessation of refugee status. Many of these provisions have been critiqued in the analysis of the law published by UNHCR in July 2025 commentary, including: 

1. Article 8 of the asylum law is the article concerned with exclusion, and it has added two exclusion grounds to what UNHCR clearly explains is an “exhaustive list” of exclusion criteria enumerated in Article 1(F) of the 1951 convention. Most importantly, the second ground for exclusion in Article 8 stipulates the exclusion of anyone who has committed a prior “serious crime” while omitting the crucial phrase “non-political”, in contrast with Article 1(F) of the refugee convention which allows for exclusion in case of serious reason to believe “serious non-political crime” was committed outside the country of refuge). 

2. ِِِArticle 8 added two entirely novel grounds for exclusion, despite what UNHCR described as the “exhaustive” nature of the exclusion grounds outlined in Article 1(F) of the treaty. UNHCR’s analysis makes it clear that inclusion or designation on “terrorist lists” should not automatically activate exclusion grounds as it could easily fit the definition of a political crime which should not lead to exclusion from protection. Inclusion on such lists may trigger a process of reassessment which always has to be individualised.

3. As for committing any acts that would “prejudice national security and public order”, UNHCR maintains that, within the framework of the 1951 convention, such grounds cannot be used for exclusion. States are entitled to take measures to mitigate against threats to national security, such measures are dealt with in articles 32 and 33 of the convention which are concerned with those already deemed refugees who may pose a threat of that nature and may include removal to a third country. Ultimately, UNHCR’s commentary recommended that the exhaustive list of exclusion grounds listed in Article 1(F) should be copied verbatim and amended in the law. 

4. The 45-day deadline for asylum seekers entering irregularly is excessively short. UNHCR and the refugee convention explicitly maintain that, while states are justified in requiring asylum seekers who entered irregularly to present themselves to authorities and register, there should never be any punishment for entering irregularly or failure to regularise within a certain timeframe. This is especially salient considering that, according to UNHCR statistics, over 90% of refugees in the past two years have entered irregularly. In addition to the law’s criminalisation of irregular entry for failure to apply for asylum within 45 days, the bylaws provide no guarantees that an asylum seeker who misses the 45 days deadline following irregular entry would even be allowed to claim asylum in Egypt. 

5. UNHCR further explained that “omission of essential data” is not and cannot be grounds for revocation of refugee status in and of itself, unless it is determined that a person should not have been granted refugee status in the first place. 

6. Similarly, UNHCR’s analysis critiqued Article 9 (3) of the law for allowing revocation on the basis of violations of the constitution, national laws or “societal values and traditions”, and explained that such incidents should not constitute grounds for revocation but rather  be dealt with in accordance with the existing laws. Even in the most extreme cases where a serious threat to national security is determined and expulsion can be invoked, it does not necessarily invalidate the asylum claim and the protection from return to the country where a risk of persecution or serious harm exists. 

2. UNHCR also critiqued the cessation clauses included in article 33 of the law for expanding the grounds of punishing procedural infractions with cessation. The bylaws conversely doubled down on the punitive approach linking procedural violations to the asylum claim. Article 16 of the bylaws, for instance, renders an asylum application null (leading to closure of the case file) in case of failure to appear in hearings or to submit certain documentation, or failure to comply with restrictions that may be placed per article 10 of the law as a temporary measure or under Article 15 of the bylaws (which adds new temporary measures).  Article 17 of the bylaws adds four new procedural grounds that could lead to denial of asylum, including submission filed by someone who is not legally mandated to represent the claimant, while article 16 of the bylaws includes provisions that could lead to cancellation of closure of file in case the asylum seeker could not be reached twice over a 14-day period. 

3. This punitive approach is incompatible with the 1951 and 1969 conventions and customary law, and could undermine the whole asylum protection system and transform it into criminal proceedings with limited rights. The right to seek asylum must be protected, and issues with misrepresentation or procedural and legal violations should be dealt with through the appropriate civil or criminal mechanism without necessarily impacting asylum claims or status. 

4. Requirement for a signed declaration that the refugee has not committed serious crimes or has not carried or used weapons in armed violence outside the bounds of the law is inconsistent with international refugee law as it potentially expands exclusion grounds. Any language on serious crimes or use of weapons must be brought in line with international law by explicitly qualifying it as non-political crime.

 

5. Concerns over the new refugee status determination process

 

1. The registration and refugee status determination (RSD) process, covered by articles 7-13 in the bylaws, provide some procedural clarity and safeguards as far as the most technical part of the process is concerned, such as the claimant’s right to an individual hearing, legal representation, translation into a language they understand and detailed procedures for vulnerable groups defined in the bylaws.

2. The bylaws confirmed the unrealistic provisions of the law requiring the Standing Committee to make determinations on asylum claims within six months for those who enter the country legally and 12 months for applicants who enter illegally.  While commendableو to attempt timely processing of asylum claims, these timelines should be explicitly listed as a guideline subject to extension when needed, so that expedition of determination does not come at the expense of asylum seekers' right to make their claim in a detailed hearing. 

3. Realistically, the registration and RSD process merits continued cooperation and a continued active role for UNHCR for a transitional period of five  years at least, in keeping with the practice of neighbouring countries where UNHCR provides support to national asylum bodies as an observer or expert to provide technical advice on process compliance with international law. In UNHCR’s analysis of the law, it made a recommendation for its inclusion as an ex officio member of the Standing Committee to advise and support, given its experience as the decision maker in asylum cases in Egypt for decades and its supervisory authority mandated by Art 35 of the 1951 convention).

4. Denial or exclusion from the asylum process due to failure to communicate twice with the committee over a14-day period or for other procedural reasons that have to do with appointments and document submission is excessive and would lead to a direct abrogation of international law. Such clauses from article 16 should be scrapped.

5. The operating procedures regulating the right to legal representation during the RSD process (under article 4 of the bylaws) are welcome, guaranteeing legal representation and specific measures to ensure adequate representation of unaccompanied minors. But the vague provision that entrusts the Committee itself with the power to accredit legal representatives of asylum seekers is unclear on what process the Committee will adopt to assess capacity of legal representatives and issue accreditations. This is of particular  importance given that one of the expanded grounds for rejecting asylum claims listed in article 17 include “filing an application by someone who does not have the legal standing to represent the claimant”. 

6. The provision on legal representation must be flexible in allowing legal representation based on the applicant’s informed consent—with appropriate guarantees against exploitation or abuse—especially by recognised CSOs and refugee-led organisations that have long experience in this area.

 

6. Guarantees for a fair and effective appeal process

 

1. As indicated above, the bylaws contain no provisions that protect asylum seekers from refoulement during all phases of the review of their asylum claims. Without guaranteeing the protection of asylum seekers pending complete review of their claims, the  law and its implementing regulations fail to guarantee the fundamental right to claim asylum. 

2. The bylaws create an inadequately short timeframe of 15 days for a rejected asylum seeker to file a request for review with the Standing Committee, who must decide on the review within 30 days. More time should be given for the filing of the request for review and the subsequent decision, giving the applicant sufficient time to examine the initial decision and secure additional information and documents to support their request for review and allowing the committee enough time to duly consider them. If it takes 6-12 months for the Standing Committee to decide on asylum claims, asylum seekers should be afforded a minimum of 60 days to submit a request for review and up to six months for deciding on the request for review. 

3. The bylaws must clearly stipulate that the request for review shall not be considered by the same Committee officers who had issued the initial decision. They must also explicitly grant applicants the right to request a second oral hearing, with proper legal representation and interpretation, before a decision is made on the request for review.  

4. Article 20 confirms that all decisions of the Standing Committee are subject to judicial review in front of administrative courts. However, the bylaws do not give this judicial review any suspensive effects. The bylaws clearly stipulate that an asylum seeker who appeals before administrative courts against a decision of rejection by the Standing Committee is to be processed for deportation even before they are scheduled for an initial court hearing. As judicial review is a key procedural safeguard to guarantee fairness in asylum processing, it must have suspensive effects to ensure that no refugee is subjected to refoulement.

The provisions on judicial review in the bylaws must be clearly defined to specify:

1.  The scope of the Administrative Court’s review,  and whether they have the right to grant asylum as part of the RSD, or only overturn appealed decisions and referring the claimant back to the Standing Committee for reexamination, in which case the application must be considered by officials other than those that had issued the initial decision. 

2. The right to appear in person or via counsel for oral hearings before the court, and to submit additional information and evidence supporting their claim. 

3. Guarantees for the same rights articulated for the applicant during the initial review by the committee, including legal counsel, interpretation, suspensive effect during court review, and guarantees for children and other marginalized groups.

4. Allowing for a period of at least 60 for filing a court appeal, as recommended in the UNHCR 2025 analysis of the law.  

5. Guarantees for the right to challenge the court of administrative justice’s first instance decision before the Supreme Administrative court, in line with applicable administrative law in ordinary cases. . 

 

7.   Safeguards related to “temporary measures” 

 

1. UNHCR’s commentary on the asylum law, consistent with other analyses of the law, strongly criticised Article 10 for the vague and broad grounds giving the standing committee discretion to impose arbitrary and undue measures on refugees and asylum seekers. UNHCR noted that the scope of Article 10 may lead to restrictions or derogations of the rights of refugees that are beyond what is allowed in international and regional refugee and human rights law. Under international refugee law, “measures and procedures towards the refugee for considerations of national security and public order” refer only to specific measures, including the use of detention or the possibility of not issuing Convention Travel Documents for ‘compelling reasons of national security or public order’ (Article 28 of the 1951 Convention).”

2. Certain rights, UNHCR maintains, may not be derogated from under any circumstances, including in times of war and emergency,  especially protections against nonrefoulement, and recommends that other rights that can be suspended must be limited and proportionate with a legitimate need.

3. The bylaws add further temporary restrictions against  all asylum seekers in article 15, subject to the discretion of the Standing Committee, on the same broad and vague grounds of national security and public order considerations. Additional temporary measures include requirements that asylum seekers “present themselves to the Committee regularly in order to confirm their physical whereabouts”, to undergo regular medical and psychological examination and to update the Committee within 24 hours of any change of contact information.These restrictions raise serious concern in light article 16 stipulating the closure of files for failure to comply with such restrictions.

 

8. Refugee Rights

 

1. UNHCR’s commentary on the law welcomed the law’s provisions allowing access to employment, including self-employment, primary health care and elementary education. However, the bylaws fail to elaborate the measures regulating the enjoyment of these rights under other applicable laws. UNHCR specifically recommended that the bylaws include a clause exempting refugees from conditions under the Labour Law that would be difficult to fulfill by reason of being a refugee (such as providing particular identity or other documents). 

2. The bylaws only refer to the right to primary healthcare for refugees, and support and facilitation for asylum seeking children to access elementary education. Since the start of the current campaign of detention and deportation, refugees have been routinely  denied access to primary healthcare because of lack of residency, even though the inability to renew residency permits is due to a significant backlog at the Ministry of Interior.  The bylaws should stipulate that refugee documentation (whether issued by UNHCR or the Standing Committee) are in and of themselves guarantors of legal status and access to the  rights accorded to refugees and asylum seekers. 

 

9. Remaining concerns regarding criminalisation

 

1. One of the most grave concerns over the asylum law was the provision in article 37 punishing with imprisonment citizens for assisting asylum seekers or providing them with shelter. This remains unaddressed and could have ramifications for rights to housing and work. Already, there are reports of Egyptians refusing to lease apartments or employ refugees in some cases for fear of this criminalisation.  

2. Similarly, concern remains over the language included in article 29 of the law, described by UNHCR in its commentary as very broad and vague, prohibiting “acts hostile towards [the refugee's] country of origin or any other country”, with serious  ramifications for revocation referenced in other articles both in the law and the bylaws. In addition to revocation of refugee status, refugees who violate Article 29 of the Asylum Law face the possibility of imprisonment for a period of no less than three years and/or a fine. 

3. There remains a serious protection gap for those seeking asylum on grounds criminalised in Egyptian legislation. There must remain a separate avenue to seek protection and possible resettlement in these cases, consistent with similar practices in many countries that have made the transition to national asylum systems.